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LEGALIZED GAMING AND POLITICAL
CONTRIBUTIONS: WHEN THE DICEMAN
COMETH, WILL CORRUPTION GOETH?
BONNY BUMILLER*

I.

INTRODUCTION

You are an officer of a company that owns several riverboat
casinos. Your best friend is running for State Representative and
you want to make a financial contribution to her campaign. Would
it surprise you to find out that you may be prohibited from doing
so? Don't be so shocked - several states have statutes that
prohibit political contributions from key persons in the gaming
industry.! One of the main reasons for such statutes is to reduce
corruption or the appearance of corruption.2
Part II of this comment explores the history of legal and
illegal gaming in our country and illustrates some of the reasons
that state legislatures have enacted statutes forbidding political
contributions from persons in this industry. Part III analyzes
several key cases and statutes that courts have struggled to
interpret. Part IV proposes a statute that may serve as a model
for states seeking to enact similar statutes. Part V concludes that
such statutes, in spite of their restriction on First Amendment
rights, are constitutional.

* Bonny Bumiller is a 2007 graduate of the John Marshall Law School.
She dedicates this article, and gives great thanks, to her parents, Jim and
Sylvia, and to everyone at DPOP (the Democratic Party of Oak Park), all of
whom encouraged and supported her along the way.
1. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 4-33-10-2.1 (2002) (prohibiting contributions from
any officer or person who holds an interest in a gaming entity); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 5:12-138 (West 2005) (prohibiting contributions from casino officers,
directors, or key employees).
2. See, e.g., In re Soto, 565 A.2d 1088, 1096 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989) (describing the concern that political contributions by casino licensees,
whether individuals or organizations, give the appearance of buying influence
and favoritism). The In re Soto court discussed this phenomenon of influence
at great length. Id. at 1096-97. The court was as concerned with actual
impropriety and corruption as it was with the appearance of such corruption,
which is far more subtle. Id.
1089

1090

The John MarshallLaw Review

II.

[40:1089

BACKGROUND

Why limit political contributions from persons in the gaming
industry? What's wrong with gaming, if anything, anyway?
A. A Brief History of Gaming
The United States has a long history with the gaming
industry, both legal and illegal.3 In fact, the history of gaming in
the United States began long before we became a nation.4
Nelson Rose, a professor at Whittier Law School, provides
some background to United States gaming history and explains
that there were three waves of legalized gambling in North
America.5 The first wave began with the earliest settlers in the
1600s and lasted approximately until the 1860s.6 The Spanish and
the Dutch brought cards and dice with them to the New World in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.! Some of our earliest
settlements were funded in part by English lotteries.8 From
approximately 1607 to 1820, private lotteries and sweepstakes
benefited the Continental Army, various charities, and even
colleges such as Harvard University and what is today Columbia
University.9 Also in the Northeast, New York was the home of the
first racetrack in 1666.' o In the South, New Orleans was
recognized as a gaming capital shortly after it was founded in
1716.11
3. See, e.g., RICHARD SASULY, BOOKIES AND BETTORS: Two HUNDRED
YEARS OF GAMBLING 55-56 (Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1982) (describing New

Englanders' gambling in the nineteenth century); ROBERT K. DEARMENT,
KNIGHTS OF THE GREEN CLOTH: THE SAGA OF THE FRONTIER GAMBLERS 60-61

(Univ. of Okla. Press 1982) (relating a near-lynching that took place over a
horse racing controversy in the territory of Colorado in the 1860s); STEPHEN
LONGSTREET, WIN OR LOSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN AMERICA 30-

31 (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1977) (describing games of chance in the colonies such
as dice, cards, and horse racing as well as the laws that quickly followed,
which outlawed games, especially during church services).
4. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: The New Millennium, in
GAMBLING: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? 113, 117 (Gerda Reith ed., Prometheus
Books 2003).
5. Rose, supra note 4, at 117-20.
6. Id. at 117-18.
7. LONGSTREET, supranote 3, at 29-30.
8. Rose, supra note 4, at 117. See also JOHN M. FINDLAY, PEOPLE OF
CHANCE: GAMBLING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY FROM JAMESTOWN TO LAS VEGAS

12 (Oxford Univ. Press 1986) (stating that the third charter of the Virginia
Company of London, granted in 1612, permitted lotteries in order "to raise
money for the colonial venture").
9. Stephanie A. Martz, Note: Legalized Gambling and Public Corruption:
Removing the Incentive to Act Corruptly, or, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks,
13 J.L. & POL. 453, 458 (1997).

10. Rose, supra note 4, at 117.
11. TIMOTHY L. O'BRIEN, BAD BET: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE GLAMOUR,
GLITZ, AND DANGER OF AMERICA'S GAMBLING INDUSTRY 99-100 (Random
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Why was gaming so popular? It was a successful way to raise
money for public projects, and it provided a handsome profit to
private operators as well."2
But scandals, including lottery
drawings that were never held, advance tip-offs of winning
numbers to friends, as well as a newfound morality,
led to all but
3
two states banning lotteries by state constitution.'
If gambling is bad, then prohibiting it must be good, right?
Perhaps idealists thought there was some truth to this in theory.
However, in practice the situation was much different.
Prohibiting gambling had serious drawbacks. Illegal gambling
was often run by organized crime figures and public officials, both
of whom often accepted bribes in order to allow gaming to go
unchecked."
The second wave of legalized gambling in America lasted from
approximately 1860 until 1910. '
Gaming was a "painless"
revenue-builder for the South, and popular frontier entertainment
in the West 6 (home to such legendary gamblers as Wyatt Earp,
Doc Holliday, and Bat Masterson).'
Meanwhile, in Louisiana,
lottery operators attempted to literally buy the state legislature.'"
Technological advances allowed lotteries to sell tickets nationwide,
but Congress has since eliminated lottery sales through the U.S.
mail and interstate and foreign commerce. 19 By 1910, all but three
states had once again outlawed gaming."
The third wave of legalized gambling began during the
Depression and continues to this day.' Nevada legalized casino
gaming in 1931." Parimutuel gaming, charity bingo, and state
lotteries soon followed.'"

House 1998).

12. Martz, supra note 9, at 458-59.
13. See Rose, supra note 4, at 118 (explaining that by 1862, every state but
Missouri and Kentucky had completely banned lotteries).
14. Martz, supra note 9, at 459.
15. Rose, supra note 4, at 118-19.
16. Id.
17. DEARMENT, supra note 3, at 102.
18. Rose, supra note 4, at 119.
19. Id. (citing what are now 18 U.S.C. § § 1301, 1302 (2005), first adopted
Mar. 4, 1909).
20. See id. (explaining that by 1910, only Maryland, Kentucky, and New
York had not outlawed gaming).
21. Id. at 120.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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B. Gaming Today
The pervasiveness of gaming in today's society hardly means
that its image is completely sanitized. 4
Many critics have
suggested that gaming is immoral, 5 that a state's use of revenue
from gaming is unethical, 6 that compulsive gambling is a serious
addiction rendered even more serious by legalized gaming,7 and
24. See generally JACKSON LEARS, SOMETHING FOR NOTHING: LUCK IN
AMERICA 4 (Viking Penguin 2003) (citing William Safire, Now: Bet While You
Booze, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at A17) (arguing that hard work, talent, and
merit lead to success, while relying on chance and luck lead to a lifetime of
failure); B. Grant Stitt et al., Community Satisfaction With Casino Gambling:
An Assessment After the Fact, in GAMBLING: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? 96, 107
(Gerda Reith ed., Prometheus Books 2003) (reporting that perceptions of
residents of communities that have adopted casino gaming is mixed, but varies
widely across the country). Residents of Biloxi, Mississippi, reacted favorably
in general toward casinos, while residents of Sioux City, Iowa, and East
Peoria, Illinois, reacted negatively. Id.
25. See generally Alberta Conference of Catholic Bishops, Gambling Is
Morally Questionable, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 20, 21-22 (James
D. Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002) (arguing that gambling promotes antiChristian values such as exploiting the poor, and encouraging greed and
covetousness); Chapter 1 Preface: Is Gambling Immoral?, in GAMBLING:
OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 19, 19 (James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002)
(quoting Ralph Reed, former director of the Christian Coalition, who stated
that "[gambling is] a cancer on the body politic, stealing food from the mouths
of children, turning wives into widows").
26. See Michael Nelson, State Lotteries Are an Unethical Source of
Government Revenue, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 31, 33 (James D.
Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002) (arguing that state involvement with
gaming is a deal with the devil, and that gaming patrons are
disproportionately poor, uneducated, and black); see also Stanton Peele, Is
Gamblingan Addiction Like Drug and Alcohol Addiction? Developing Realistic
and Useful Conceptions of Compulsive Gambling, in GAMBLING: WHO WINS?
WHO LOSES? 208, 216 (Gerda Reith ed., Prometheus Books 2003) (asserting
that gambling is a state-sponsored addiction that is aggressively marketed by
appealing to escapist fantasies, causing family and society harm while
appealing to personal gratification).
27. See Ronald M. Pavalko, Compulsive Gambling Is an Addiction, in
GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 49, 51 (James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven
Press 2002) (arguing that the symptoms of pathological gambling - including
illegal acts, lies, job losses, and dysfunctional relationships - are remarkably
similar to those of alcoholism). See also Bernard P. Horn, The Gambling
Industry Preys on Compulsive Gamblers, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS
69, 70-71 (James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002) (asserting that the
gaming industry not only is fully aware of the addictive nature of its product,
but actively works to hook, exploit, and keep addicts); Mark Griffiths and
Jonathan Parke, The Environmental Psychology of Gambling, in GAMBLING:
WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? 277, 278-82 (Gerda Reith ed., Prometheus Books
2003) (discussing situational determinants and sensory factors that induce
gambling, such as sound effects and noise, music, lighting, color, and even
aroma); Henry R. Lesieur, The Social Costs of Compulsive Gambling Are
Enormous, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 82, 83-85 (James D. Torr ed.,
Greenhaven Press 2002) (stating that the social ills of compulsive gambling
include embezzlement, family disruption, bankruptcy, emotional stress, and
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that legalized gaming harms local economies.29
On the other hand, some commentators argue that gaming is
a harmless form of amusement, 9 that its use as a revenuegenerating device is ethical," that compulsive gambling is not an

job loss); Tom Grey, Compulsive Gambling Is a Serious Problem Among
Teenagers, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 77, 78 (James D. Torr ed.,
Greenhaven Press 2002) (stating that more than one million teens are
addicted to gambling, and that the addiction rate in teen gamblers is three
times that in adults); Chapter 2 Preface: How Serious Is the Problem of
Compulsive Gambling?, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 48, 48 (James
D. Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002) (describing the personal story of a
compulsive gambler, "Denise," who had amassed over eighty thousand dollars
in gambling debts, declared bankruptcy, and made a suicide attempt before
she sought help). Ironically, Denise was a social worker who counseled others
on addictions. Id.
28. See Economist, Legalized Gambling Harms Local Economies, in
GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 99, 102 (James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven

Press 2002) (contending that increases in jobs, tax revenues, and economic
development are illusionary because consumer dollars are merely cannibalized
away from the rest of the economy). See also David Pace, Indian Gaming Does
Not Benefit Most Native Americans, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 123,
124-27 (James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002) (asserting that gaming
has neither significantly reduced unemployment nor increased tribal
revenues); Earl L. Grinols, Cutting the Cards and Craps: Right Thinking
About Gambling Economics, in GAMBLING: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? 67, 84

(Gerda Reith ed., Prometheus Books 2003) (calculating that a local economy
loses one hundred and fifty-six dollars per capita when it permits casino
gambling); Robert Goodman, Grand Illusions, in GAMBLING: WHO WINS? WHO
LOSES? 88, 93 (Gerda Reith ed., Prometheus Books 2003) (criticizing the
"grand illusion" of gaming as a viable strategy for economic development
because of gaming's costs to communities). For example, about one third of
Atlantic City's retailers went out of business within four years after casino
gaming began. Id.; see also Chapter3 Preface:How Does Legalized Gambling
Affect Communities?, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 98, 98 (James D.
Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002) (stating that since the first casino opened in
Tunica County, Mississippi, the results have been mixed). On one hand, the
casino revenue has been used to build new schools, roads, an airport, and
more. Id. On the other hand, the community still has no major grocery store,
pharmacy, or movie theater, and its public schools have the lowest scores in
the country. Id.
29. See Frank J. Fahrenkopf Jr., Responsible Gambling is Harmless Fun, in
GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 26, 27 (James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven
Press 2002) (arguing that gambling, like television game shows, is just "[fiun,
fun, fun"). Mr. Fahrenkopf is president and CEO of the American Gaming
Association. Not unexpectedly, much of the pro-gaming literature has been
written by those within the industry itself. Mixed and negative analyses of
gaming generally come from independent studies, universities, and other
disinterested sources. Id. See also Kathryn Gabriel, Playing the Gods:
Gambling and Spirituality,a New Anthropological Perspective, in GAMBLING:
WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? 334, 344-45 (Gerda Reith ed., Prometheus Books
2003) (comparing gambling to prayer, noting that each is a method of seeking
both divine affirmation and reversal of fortune).
30. See N. Am. Ass'n of State & Provincial Lotteries, State Lotteries Are an
Ethical Source of Government Revenue, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS
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addiction, 3' and that the gaming industry works to reduce
compulsive gambling. 3 Those who support this view also argue
that the problem of compulsive gambling is exaggerated,3 that
crime rates,3 and that legalized
casino gambling does not increase
3
1
economy.
the
benefits
gambling

37, 38 (James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002) (arguing that lottery
revenues benefit a wide variety of causes, including education, economic
development, the environment, senior citizens' programs, health care, and
cultural activities).
31. See Michael Walker, Compulsive Gambling Is Not an Addiction, in
GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 58, 59-60 (James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven

Press 2002) (arguing that compulsive gambling as a behavior is substantially
different from substance addiction). See also Howard J. Shaffer, A Critical
View of Pathological Gambling and Addiction: Comorbidity Makes for
Syndromes and Other Strange Bedfellows, in GAMBLING: WHO WINS? WHO
LOSES? 175, 178-85 (Gerda Reith ed., Prometheus Books 2003) (stating that
there is no agreement in the mental health community regarding whether
compulsive gambling is an addiction, and that it is difficult to tell whether a
behavior that is not controlled is one that is uncontrollable); Mark Dickerson,
Pathological Gambling: What's In a Name? Or, How the United States Got It
Wrong, in GAMBLING: WHO WINS? WHO LOSES? 191, 201 (Gerda Reith ed.,
Prometheus Books 2003) (suggesting that the model of pathological gambling
as an illness, a primarily American view, from which the only recovery is total
abstinence, is a result of social and political forces). This model, Dickerson
suggests, is analogous to the disease model of alcoholism. Id. Dickerson
argues that when the disease model is well accepted in the medical
community, scientists are likely to view quitting as the only way for problem
gamblers to recover. Id. Such scientists are far less willing to evaluate the
possibility of problem gamblers modifying or reducing their gaming behavior.
Id.
32. See American Gaming Ass'n, The Gambling Industry Is Working to
Reduce Compulsive Gambling, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 73, 74-76

(James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002) (asserting that the gaming
industry makes diligent efforts to combat problem gambling by funding
research and educational awareness of the problem).
33. See Nick Gillespie, The Problem of Compulsive Gambling Is
Exaggerated, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 91, 95 (James D. Torr ed.,

Greenhaven Press 2002) (stating that less than five percent of all adults
exposed to gaming may develop into pathological gamblers).
34. See Jay Albanese, Casino Gambling and Crime, in GAMBLING: WHO
WINS? WHO LOSES? 149, 150 (Gerda Reith ed., Prometheus Books 2003)
(documenting a decrease in Atlantic City's crime rate after the addition of
casinos, offset by the population increase).
35. See Frank J. Fahrenkopf Jr., Legalized Gambling Benefits Local
Economies, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS 107, 110 (James D. Torr ed.,

Greenhaven Press 2002) (arguing that gaming is good for local economies).
For example, in counties that have established casinos, welfare payments and
unemployment have dropped dramatically, while tax revenues and the
number of jobs have greatly increased. See also Economics Resource Group,
Indian Gaming Benefits Native Americans, in GAMBLING: OPPOSING
VIEWPOINTS 116, 118-19 (James D. Torr ed., Greenhaven Press 2002) (arguing
that casino gaming has become a boon to Native Americans, allowing them to
build wealth and to reduce unemployment, poverty, and other social ills).
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At least one economist, Richard Sasuly, has suggested that
the respectability of gaming fell as that of debt formation rose.36
This is somewhat ironic, in light of the fact that gaming and debt
have much in common. 37
Problems with gaming were not restricted to any one
particular geographic location; arguably, any gambling city has
had problems dealing with the "effects" of gaming. For example,
Atlantic City began as an oceanfront resort town in 1854."8 By the
1880s, it was home to numerous gambling establishments and
brothels, often frequented by gangsters. 3' By the early twentieth
century, it was known for crooked elections, extortion, lucrative
contracts awarded to supporters of those in power, as well as
payoffs to conduct illegal gaming.4" When New Jersey governor
Brendan Byrne signed the Casino Control Act in 1977, which
authorized gambling in Atlantic City, he said to organized crime:
"keep your filthy hands out of Atlantic City and keep them the hell
out of our state."4'
C. Dealing with Legalized Gaming
Statutory attempts to combat corruption are nothing new.42
After a number of political scandals, in the 1970s Congress passed
a law limiting political contributions. 43 This law was an attempt to
36. SASULY, supra note 3, at 40.
37. See id. at 40-43 (explaining that in seventeenth century Massachusetts,
both gaming and debt formation, or money lending with interest, were viewed
with disdain, as they diverted people from labor, promoted unearned wealth,
contradicted religious teachings, and carried risk. However, they both also
fostered the accumulation of capital and economic growth).
38. Ovid Demaris, THE BOARDWALK JUNGLE 15-16 (Bantam Books 1986).
39. Id. at 18, 22.
40. Id. at 23.
41. Editorial, A Brave, New Atlantic City, WASH. POST, June 7, 1977, at
A16.
42. See Christopher James Kane, Analyzing the CampaignFinance Debate:
The Spectrum of Reform and Louisiana'sTrump Card, 4 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
27-28 (2003) (citing the Tillman Act of Jan. 26, 1907, Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864
(current version at 2 U.S.C. § 4416 (2005)), which attempts to curb corporate
influence and eliminate corporate political contributions without shareholder
consent); Comment, Problems in Corporate and Union Spending in Federal
Elections, 31 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 370 (1959) (discussing the types of political
activities prohibited by federal statute which regulate the financial
contributions of corporations and labor unions); Federal Corrupt Practices Act
of 1925, Ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (recodifying and strengthening the
Tillman Act); Hatch Political Activities Act of 1940, Ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 1502(a)(3), 1503 (2005)) (attempting to reduce
the ability of politicians to influence elections); Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Ch.
120, 61 Stat. 136 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2005)) (extending
prohibitions to include expenditures as well as contributions because of the
congressional investigations into the 1944 and 1946 elections); Law of June
25, 1948, Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 723 (revising the judicial code).
43. See Scott Mason, Casenote: Casino Ass'n of La. v. State: The Louisiana
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thwart quid pro quo corruption.44 Many states quickly followed
Congress' lead.45
Some states have further chosen to enact
statutes that prohibit or limit political contributions specifically
from persons in the gaming industry.'
In those states that have chosen to legalize gambling, there is
some evidence that legalization does not remove corrupt public
officials.47 Rather, "[legalization] transfers [corruption] from the
local
law-enforcement
level
to
state
legislatures
and
administrative agencies.'
For this reason, in several states that
allow gaming, the legislatures have chosen to enact statutes that
prohibit or limit contributions from persons in the gaming
industry to elected officials, candidates, or parties. 49 These states
include Indiana," Iowa,5 Kentucky," Louisiana, 3 Michigan, 4
Nebraska,55 New Jersey,56 and Virginia.57 Courts have often upheld
the constitutionality of such statutes.' On the other hand, courts
have generally found statutes that attempt to limit or prohibit
contributions supporting or opposing ballot measures or referenda
Supreme Court's Retreat From First Amendment Protection For Campaign
Contributors,48 LOY. L. REV. 795, 795 (2002) (citing Fed. Election Campaign
Act amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (current
version at 21 U.S.C. § 441a (2005))).
44. Mason, supra note 43, at 795.
45. Id.
46. See id. (citing Casino Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 503-04, which identified
a number of state statutes prohibiting political contributions by persons in the
gaming industry).
47. Martz, supra note 9, at 458.
48. Id. at 455.
49. Casino Ass'n of La. v. State ex rel. Foster, 2002-0265, p. 13 (La. 6/21/02);
820 So.2d 494, 503.
50. See IND. CODE § 4-33-10-2.1 (2005) (prohibiting contributions from any
officer or person holding an interest in a gaming entity).
51. See IOWA CODE § 99.F6(4)(a) (2005) (prohibiting contributions from
riverboat gambling corporations).
52. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154A.160 (West 2005) (prohibiting
contributions from persons owning lottery contracts).
53. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2 (2005) (prohibiting contributions
from owners and employees of casinos).
54. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.207(b)(4)-(5) (2005) (prohibiting
contributions from any licensee or person with an interest in a gaming entity).
55. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1469.01 (2005) (prohibiting contributions
from lottery contractors, both during the contract as well as for three years
after the contract).
56. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-138 (West 2005) (prohibiting contributions
from casino officers or key employees).
57. See VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-375, 376 (2005) (prohibiting contributions
from pari-mutuel corporations, executives, their husbands, wives, and family
members).
58. See generally In re Soto, 565 A.2d 1088 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
(upholding a ban on political contributions from a key employee of a casino);
Casino Ass'n of La. v. State ex rel. Foster, 2002-0265 (La. 06/21/02); 820 So.2d
494 (upholding a ban on political contributions from the casino industry).
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unconstitutional." These rulings are based largely on the fact that
ballot measures are not "candidates," and thus there is no chance
for "corruption" stemming from how a ballot measure is funded.'"
For example, a New Jersey statute provides:
[No] officer, director, casino key employee or principal employee of
an applicant for or holder of a casino license.., shall directly or
indirectly, pay or contribute any money or thing of value to any
candidate for nomination or election to any public office ... or to any
group, committee or association organized in support of any such
candidate or political party.6'
This statute was found constitutional in In re Soto. 2
D. CampaignFinanceReform
Statutes prohibiting contributions from persons with interests
in the gaming industry are not isolated; they are part of a larger
Champions of campaign
picture of campaign finance reform.'
finance reform praise this reform as a necessity to curb excessive
Supporters of campaign finance
influence and corruptionA
reform, such as Richard Briffault, admit that the restrictions it
imposes implicate rights of free speech and association. 5
However, these supporters argue that such limitations are
justified by the government's interest in preventing corruption or
even the appearance of corruption.' In support of this argument,
pro-reformers cite examples of corporate executives who testified
before the United States Senate Committee on Commerce in 1998,
stating that they gave political donations specifically when
Other donors
valuable government contracts were at stake."
59. See Colin L. Black, Recent Development: Brown v. State: The Louisiana
Supreme Court Considers Free Speech, Campaign Finance, and Legalized
Gambling, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1604 (1997) (citing Brown v. State ex rel.
Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 96-2204, (La. 10/15/1996); 680 So. 2d 1179, which

found unconstitutional a state statute that prohibited contributions
supporting or opposing ballot measures from a video gaming licensee).
60. Id. at 1605.
61. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-138 (2005).
62. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1088.
63. See generally, John McCain, Reclaiming Our Democracy: The Way
Forward, 3 ELECTION L. J. 115 (2004) (applauding the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), which
upheld major provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (107
P.L. 155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) [hereinafter BCRA]).
64. See Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation of
Campaign Finance Law, 3 ELECTION L. J. 147 (2004) (praising McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, calling the decision a "stunning triumph
for campaign finance reform").
65. Briffault, supra note 64, at 147.
66. Id.
67. Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr., & Michiko Ueda, Did
FirmsProfit From Soft Money?, 3 ELECTION L. J. 193 (2004).
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feared that their firms would lose competitive advantages due to
regulations if they did not contribute.'
Critics of campaign
finance reform claim that it
unconstitutionally abridges free speech.69 Indeed, one critic of the
McConnell decision, Lillian R. BeVier, went so far as to state that
"[tihere is little point in attempting one more time to persuade
either the victorious litigators or their many academic champions
that they are the ones that have got the First Amendment
backwards and that the majority opinion is wrong on just about
every point."" Another critic of campaign finance reform, Cecil C.
Kuhne, III, argues that "[t]he federal election campaign laws...
are already ... so voluminous, so detailed, so complex, that no
ordinary citizen dare run for office." 7 Kuhne skeptically advises
that no one should "even contribute a significant sum, without
hiring an expert advisor in the field,"72 and that campaign finance
reform "can be expected to grow more voluminous, more detailed,
and more complex in the years to come - and always, always, with
the objective of reducing the excessive amount of speech."73
Critics of campaign finance reform also argue that such
reform goes beyond merely interfering with speech but also
interferes with association.74 Robert F. Bauer argues that the
McConnell decision took an extremely limited view of the right of
association, and that this interpretation may signal the demise of
the right of association in the context of campaign finance law.7"
As we shall see, both arguments supporting and opposing
reforms have merit.

68. Id.

69. See Mitch McConnell, The Future Is Now, 3 ELECTION L. J. 123 (2004)
(criticizing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. Fed. Election
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, in which the author was the lead plaintiff). McConnell
states that the U.S. Supreme Court, by a one-vote margin in the McConnell
decision, "stifle[d] political discourse" and "bestowed upon Congress
extraordinary authority to regulate speech." Id.
70. See Lillian R. BeVier, McConnell v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley's First
Amendment, 3 ELECTION L. J. 127, 127-28 (2004) (arguing that the majority in

McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, did not engage in strict

scrutiny, as it should have, but rather gave far too much deference to BCRA,
like it would to other regulations affecting commercial economic activity).
71. See Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Rethinking Campaign-FinanceReform: The
PressingNeed For Deregulation and Disclosure, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 633
(2004) (arguing that corruption can be prevented or at least substantially

reduced by full disclosure of campaign contributions).
72. Id. at 639.
73. Id.
74. Robert F. Bauer, McConnell, Parties, and the Decline of the Right of
Association, 3 ELECTION L. J. 199, 199-200 (2004).

75. Id. at 199.
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III. ANALYSIS
The main legal issue concerning statutes that attempt to limit
political contributions from persons in the gaming industry is a
constitutional one. On the one hand, political contributions have
long been viewed as a form of political speech and association.76' As
such, political contributions are entitled to great protection under
the First Amendment. On the other hand, there is a strong state
interest in eliminating corruption or the appearance of
Is the interest in eliminating corruption strong
corruption."8
enough to outweigh the individual's freedom to make
contributions? The answer is, "it depends."
A.

The First Phase: Courts Support Legislation Banning
Contributions

One of the earliest cases to examine the constitutionality of a
state statute prohibiting contributions from key persons in the
gaming industry was In re Soto.79 In that case, the court found
that Ms. Soto was prohibited from both making political
contributions as well as from donating free legal services to a

76. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1096.
77. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating that Congress shall abridge neither
freedom of speech nor the people's right to peaceably assemble).
78. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1088.
79. Id. The Casino Control Commission of New Jersey had designated Ms.
Soto as a key employee because she held several key positions in the gaming
industry. Id. at 1092. Ms. Soto had been associate general counsel for Trump
Casino Hotel, and later she was Vice President for Compliance and Legal
Affairs for the Claridge Casino Hotel. Id. In both positions, she was a key
casino employee and had the required license. Id. Ms. Soto appealed the
Commission's decision that she was statutorily prohibited both from making
political contributions as well as from donating free legal services to a political
party. Id. at 1093. The statute provided:
No applicant for or holder of a casino license, nor any holding,
intermediary or subsidiary company thereof, nor any officer, director,
casino key employee or principal employee of an applicant for or holder
of a casino license or of any holding, intermediary or subsidiary
company thereof nor any person or agent on behalf of any such
applicant, holder, company or person, shall directly or indirectly, pay or
contribute any money or thing of value to any candidate for nomination
or election to any public office in this State, or to any committee of any
political party in this State, or to any group, committee or association
organized in support of any such candidate or political party.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-138 (2006).
Ms. Soto had sought a declaratory judgment that she could participate in four
political activities: (1) She wanted to serve on the Platform Resolutions
Committee of the New Jersey Hispanic Democratic Party; (2) She wanted to
provide free legal services to the New Jersey Hispanic Democrats; (3) She
wanted to be a member of the "Committee of 200," costing one thousand
dollars annually; and (4) she wanted to serve on the Affirmative Action
Committee of the New Jersey Democratic Party. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1093.
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political party."' However, the court ruled that Ms. Soto was free
to participate in committees and activities that primarily involved
assembly, advocacy, and expression of political views.81
In its ruling, the court analyzed several issues raised on
appeal. First, it evaluated the constitutionality of the statute in
light of both the state and federal constitutions." Although the
court noted a balancing test under the state constitution in In re
Soto, it also noted that the state courts look to both federal courts
as well as courts of other states when interpreting constitutional
issues.8"
The court began by stating that political activity and
association, of which contributions are a part, are among this
country's most broadly protected First Amendment rights.' When
a state limits such a protected interest, its action is subject to the
strictest scrutiny. 5 Such action by a state will be allowed only if
the state has an important conflicting interest sufficient to justify
it, and if the state limits the protected interest in the least
restrictive manner possible.'
Ms. Soto's first argument on appeal was that the complete
prohibition of political contributions violated her First Amendment
rights.
In Buckley v. Valeo, the United States Supreme Court
held that caps on contributions to federal candidates were not
unconstitutional. The In re Soto court agreed with the Court's
reasoning in Buckley that the contributor is still afforded the
ability to express his views and engage in political association, and
that the quantity of the contribution does not affect the quantity of
the communication."' In addition, the In re Soto court observed
80. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1093.
81. Id. The court found that Ms. Soto could participate in both the

Platform Resolutions Committee and the Affirmative Action Committee of the
New Jersey Democratic Party. Id. The court reasoned that these activities
primarily involved assembly, advocacy, and political expression of views. Id.
82. Id. at 1094-95. In analyzing fundamental rights under New Jersey's
Constitution, the state has developed a three-part balancing test. Id. at 1095
(citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985)); N.J. CONST.

art. I, para. 1. The courts consider "the nature of the affected right, the extent
to which the governmental restriction intrudes upon the right[,] and the public
need for the restriction." In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1095.
83. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1095.

84. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
85. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1094-95.
86. Id. at 1095.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1096 (emphasis added). Further, while a contribution to a

candidate shows the donor's support of the candidate, it does not show the
underlying basis for that support. Id. (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 2021 (1976)). Rather, the contributor's expression is symbolized by the act of

contributing. Id. A financial limit does not limit the contributor's other rights
of expression, association, or the discussion of issues. Id. Further, the Buckley
court reasoned that the prevention of corruption or the appearance of
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that "gambling is an activity rife with evil, so prepotent its
mischief in terms of the public welfare and morality that it is
governed directly by the Constitution itself."89
Another of Ms. Soto's specific challenges to the statute was
that a limit on contributions, as opposed to a total ban, should be
the means to regulate the political activity of key casino
personnel.9 ° However, the court rejected this suggestion in no
uncertain terms." The In re Soto court refused to "second-guess a
legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures
where corruption is the evil feared."92 Defining 'corruption' as "a
subversion of the political process," the In re Soto court was not
only concerned about quid pro quo corruption--dollars for favorsbut the appearance of corruption as well.93 Thus, because gaming
is a "nonessential and inherently dangerous commodity," the court
concluded that the State had great concern and thus great
constitutional power in regulating public health, safety, morals,
and general welfare.9"
corruption was a governmental interest important enough to justify
restrictions on contributions. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25-29.
89. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1097 (quoting Knight v. Margate, 431 A.2d 833,
842 (N.J. 1981)). See N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 2 (1947) (prohibiting
gambling in New Jersey unless the voters allow it through a referendum). Ms.
Soto further argued that section 138 was overbroad in prohibiting
contributions to political parties as well as to candidates. In re Soto, 565 A.2d
at 1099. To determine whether her argument was valid, the court then
analyzed the role of the modern political party. Id. at 1097-98. According to
the court, a political party can no longer be seen as merely a private
association of citizens. Id. at 1097. Rather, the modern political party is a
quasi-governmental organization, inseparable from our representative form of
government. Id. It is formed for the purpose of influencing policy and
nominating candidates for office, and its activities are regulated by our
legislatures. Id. Such policy-making could reasonably include matters
affecting or attempting to affect the casino industry. Id. at 1098. Therefore,
the state has a compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of political
parties, and restrictions such as those found in section 138 are justified. Id.
90. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1098. That is, she argued that a less restrictive
means of regulation was available. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Right to Work Comm., 459
U.S. 197,210 (1982)).
93. Id. (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497 (1985)). The court went on to reason that because
the casino industry is particularly vulnerable to organized crime, there is "no
viable alternative" to a total ban of political contributions in order to maintain
the public trust of that industry in particular, and in the state regulatory
process in general. Id.
94. Id. at 1099 (citing In re Application of Boardwalk Regency Corp. for
Casino License, 434 A.2d 1111, 1119-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981)). Ms.
Soto further argued that section 138 was overbroad in that it prohibited
contributions to all political candidates and committees, whether or not they
had anything to do with casino regulation. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1099. The
court rejected this argument, reasoning that elected representatives often
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Next, Ms. Soto argued that the phrase "thing of value" was
void for vagueness." In its interpretation, the court determined
that the legislature intended the phrase "thing of value" to extend
beyond material items such as money or property, and to include
other more subtle forms of personal advantage.' Therefore, when
read in context, the court held that the phrase "thing of value" was
not unconstitutionally vague.9 7
Ms. Soto also challenged the phrase "professional services" for
vagueness.'
The court decided that section 138 gave Ms. Soto

have influence that extends beyond their official powers. Id. (citing Schiller
Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61, 67 (Ill. 1976)). Thus, it is
impossible to tell which officeholders will be in a position to actually influence
or participate in regulating the casino industry. Id. at 1099. Therefore, it was
reasonable for the legislature to proscribe contributions to any candidate. Id.
at 1100.
95. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1101. The court noted that this phrase was used
in over 40 other New Jersey statutes. Id. at 1102. The court reasoned that
such a commonplace phrase could not be said to be vague per se. Id. Rather,
the court interpreted it using common sense within the context of the statute.
Id.
96. Id. at 1102 (quoting People v. Hochberg, 386 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y. 1976)).
97. Id.
98. Id. The court defined a "professional service" as one that (1) is
performed by a person authorized by law to practice a recognized profession;
(2) is regulated by law; (3) requires advanced knowledge and learning by
lengthy formal specialized study. Id. at 1103 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §
40A:11-2(6)). For example, technical and scientific computer services were
held to be professional, while electrical inspection and enforcement services
were not. Id. (citing Autotote Ltd. v. N.J. Sports & Exposition Authority, 427
A.2d 55, 59 (N.J. 1981)), which describes technical and professional computer
services as "professional services") Id. See Burlington Twp. v. Middle Dep't
Inspection Agency, 421 A.2d 616, 626 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (ruling
that electrical inspection and enforcement services were not "professional
services"). The In re Soto court recognized that the practice of law is not
limited to litigation, but rather encompasses a wide variety of services
requiring legal knowledge and ability. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1103. Indeed,
even some other state courts could not define the practice of law with
certainty. See, e.g., Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Lesser, 68 R.I. 14, 17, 26 A.2d 6
(1942) (defining the practice of law as "all advice to clients and all action taken
for them in matters connected with the law," though noting that it is difficult
to define precisely); State Bar of Ariz. v. Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz.
76, 87, 366 P.2d 1, 9 (Ariz. 1961) (defining the practice of law as "those acts,
whether performed in court or law office, which lawyers customarily have
carried on from day to day through centuries," while noting that it is not
possible to define the term exhaustively). The New Jersey court reasoned that
Ms. Soto could not seek to invalidate section 138 for vagueness because in so
doing, "she [was] seek[ing] to have the undefinable specifically defined." In re
Soto, 565 A.2d at 1103. The court also applied another common sense test:
Did the statute give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
conduct was forbidden? Id. (quoting In re Suspension of DeMarco, 414 A.2d
1339 (N.J. 1980). This is not "a linguistic analysis conducted in a vacuum."
Id. (quoting In re Suspension of DeMarco, 414 A.2d at 1345). Rather, it
includes the statute's language, related provisions, and the facts of the
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sufficient notice that her contributions would be interpreted as
legal, and therefore professional services.99 Although the "practice
of law" cannot be precisely defined, its indistinct definition did not
automatically make the statute void for vagueness."'
Finally, Ms. Soto argued that section 138 violated her right to
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.'1 Arguing that similarly situated persons
should be treated alike, she contended that casino employees were
wrongfully singled out and prohibited from making political
contributions. 0 2 However, the court rejected her argument,
reasoning that the legislative and judicial branches have both
recognized that the crime and corruption in the casino gaming
industry are unique and thus subject to different treatment.'0 3
If a fundamental right or suspect class is involved, the
legislative classification is subject to strict scrutiny.' 4 Because a
limitation on a person's financial contribution to a candidate or
committee does not involve direct restraint on his political
communication, the court determined that this statute has only an
indirect effect on a fundamental right."' Therefore, the statute
1 6
need only be rationally related to a state's legitimate interest. 0
Section 138 prohibits contributions by key members of the casino
industry. The court held that this statute was rationally related to
the State's interest in preventing political corruption as well as
any negative impact upon public welfare and morals.' °7
It is interesting to note that in deciding In re Soto, the New
Jersey court relied heavily on an Illinois decision regarding a
controversy. Id. at 1103.
99. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1103.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1104; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
102. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1104. Ms. Soto attempted to liken casino gaming
to the horseracing and liquor industries - also highly regulated industries
with a strong state interest in maintaining their integrity - noting that
persons in those industries were not subject to such prohibitions. Id.
103. Id. In determining whether a law violates the Equal Protection Clause,
the U.S. Supreme Court has applied a three-part test, as defined in Dunn v.
Blumstein: [1] the character of the classification in question; [2] the individual
interests affected by the classification; and [3] the governmental interests
asserted in support of the classification. Id. (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 335 (1972)).
104. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1104 (citing Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d
at 300-01). In order to justify the restriction, the state must establish a
compelling state interest supporting the classification, and that no less
restrictive alternative is available. Id.
105. Id. Also, key persons in the gaming industry did not constitute a
suspect class. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Nevertheless, the court also remarked that even if section 138 were
subject to strict scrutiny analysis, it would pass the three-part Dunn v.
Blumstein test. Id. at 1105.
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different industry (liquor), Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v.
Berz."' The New Jersey court found great similarity between the
industries of casino gaming, horseracing, and liquor, all of which
are susceptible to corruption and can be particularly harmful to
citizens if improperly regulated. 9
In Schiller Park Colonial Inn, the Illinois Supreme Court
upheld a state statute that banned liquor licensees from making
1
political contributions."
The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned
that there was a substantial state interest involved in regulating
the sale of alcohol and protecting citizens from the dangers
associated with alcohol.'
The Schiller Park Colonial Inn court
also reasoned that the State had an interest in preventing liquor
licensees from gaining influence over elected officials."' Finally,
108. Id.; Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61 (Ill. 1976).
Perhaps this is because at the time In re Soto was being decided, New Jersey
and Nevada were the only states with casino gaming. Nevada was the first
state to allow casino gaming. Act of Mar. 19, 1931, ch. 99, 1931 NEV. STAT.
165. In 1976, New Jersey became the second state to allow casino gaming,
with a voter referendum. However, interestingly, voters initially rejected a
casino referendum in 1974. Sullivan, Jersey Rejects Casino Proposal, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1974, at 1. The 1976 version allowed for much more security
and regulation. The New Jersey legislature then passed the Casino Control
Act in 1977, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 et seq., and the first casino opened in
1978. New Jersey was the only state at that time with such a statute barring
key employees from political contributions. In fact, this was the first time that
the New Jersey courts were asked to interpret section 138. Perhaps, too, New
Jersey relied on Illinois authority because, although there were many New
Jersey cases regarding regulation of the gaming industry (casinos, horse
racing, etc.), none had dealt with political contributions and therefore were not
on point. See, e.g., Niglio v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 385 A.2d 925, 929 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (barring the spouse of a disqualified person from
owning horses for the harness racing industry); Jersey Downs, Inc. v. N.J.
Racing Comm'n, 246 A.2d 146, 148 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968) (refusing
to review the applicant's harness racing license application because a harness
racing referendum had been defeated by the voters); Costanzo v. N.J. Racing
Comm'n, 313 A.2d 618, 619 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974) (approving the
commission's power to revoke licenses if it is in the public interest to do so).
109. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1099, n.3 (citing In re Boardwalk Regency
Casino License Application, 434 A.2d 1111, 1119-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1981)).
110. An Act relating to alcoholic liquors (The Liquor Control Act), ILL. REV.
STAT. 1973, ch. 43, para. 132. art. VI, § 12a.
It is unlawful for any licensee [or officer, associate, representative, agent
or employee], where more than 5% of the licensee's gross income is
derived from the sale of alcoholic liquor .... to become liable for, pay or
make any contribution directly or indirectly toward the campaign fund
or expenses of any political party, or candidate for public office ... Any
such [person who violates] any of the provisions of this Section shall be
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, and the issuing authority shall revoke
the license.

Id.
111. Schiller Park Colonial Inn, 349 N.E.2d at 65.
112. Id.
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the Schiller Park Colonial Inn court expressed concern that
without the ban, liquor licensees might be pressured to make
contributions."'
The licensees argued that the statute infringed upon their
constitutional right of free speech."' However, because the statute
did not prevent the licensees from participating in the political
process, voting, joining political parties, or otherwise advocating
their views, the court determined that the statute was not
unconstitutional."5 In addition, the court upheld a total ban,
rather than a limit, on contributions, reasoning that licensees who
aggregated smaller contributions
could otherwise thwart the
6
purpose of the statute."
It is quite interesting to note that although the In re Soto
court found Schiller Park Colonial Inn to be persuasive authority,
there are two notable differences between the cases. First, the
Illinois statute did not define contributing "thing[s] of value" as
did the New Jersey statute. The Schiller Park Colonial Inn court
interpreted that a "contribution," as used in the Illinois statute,
referred strictly to money."'
Hypothetically, it is not clear whether the New Jersey court
would consider such professional services a "thing of value" (and
thus prohibited under section 138) if provided for valuable
consideration, but at a discounted rate. The state statute itself

113. Id. at 65-66. Regarding the last point, that liquor licensees might feel
pressure to make political contributions, the Schiller Park Colonial Inn court
did not elaborate on where this pressure might come from. Id. Did the court
think pressure might come from other licensees? Perhaps if a licensee knows
his competitors may contribute, he may feel obligated to do so as well, to "keep
up with the Joneses." Or did the court think this pressure might come from
officials themselves, who would offer to consider more favorable regulations for
contributors, or threaten stricter regulations for non-supporters? The court
was silent on these points, but perhaps it considered both possibilities.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 66.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 69. The Schiller Park Colonial Inn court remarked that one other
way that the liquor licensees could have participated in the political process,
in addition to voting, joining parties, etc., would be volunteering services to
political parties or groups. Id. Yet this is exactly what the In re Soto court
rejected! However, the In re Soto court distinguished between providing
personal, non-professional services incidental to membership in a political
organization (which would not have violated section 138) and providing
professional legal services (which did violate section 138). In re Soto, 565 A.2d
at 1100. The In re Soto court reasoned that free legal services were valuable
not because of the volunteer's personal ideological beliefs and advocacy of
these beliefs, as is much of political volunteering, but rather because of the
volunteer's professional skill and expertise. Id. at 1101. Because a candidate
or party would otherwise have to pay for legal services, the In re Soto court
reasoned that such services, when provided at no charge, were
indistinguishable from money. Id.
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does not make this distinction. However, the United States
Supreme Court noted that such discounts were "financial support"
to campaigns.""
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that lenders'
discounts were a "thing of value," according to the Retail
Installment Sales Act of 1960 (RISA).' 9 Because the In re Soto
court seemed determined to interpret the statute strictly against
political contributions from key casino employees, it is quite
possible that the court would find that discounted professional
services would be a "thing of value." Their "value" would arguably
be the difference between the market rate and the rate actually
charged. If this indeed were the case, such services would be
likely to be violative of section 138.
It is also unclear whether the New Jersey courts would
permit casinos to hire lobbyists to influence legislators. That is, is
a lobbyist's service a "thing of value"? Other jurisdictions have
considered similar issues."O The court did not discuss whether
subjective intent of the donor might assist in determining if an
item was a "thing of value." This is a factually difficult issue.
Indeed, the recipient official in this case argued that he did not
value the items given to him!"'
118. 'Financial Support' means a direct or indirect contribution where the
purpose, object or foreseeable effect of the support is to influence the election
of a candidate. Financial support includes, but is not limited to:
1. Contributions of money, securities, or any material thing of value;
2. Payments to or subscription for fund raising events of any kind (e.g.
raffles, dinners, beer or cocktail parties and so forth);
3. Discounts in the price or cost of goods or services, except to the extent
that commercially established discounts are generally available to the
customers of the supplier.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 126 (1982) (emphasis
added)(interpreting article V, § 27, of the 1978 USWA Constitution).
119. Sherman v. Citibank, 668 A.2d 1036, 1055 (1995)(interpreting N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-50 (2004)).
120. In State v. Hoebel, 41 N.W.2d 865, 867 (Wis. 1950), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that spending by lobbyists to give food to friends of
legislators for the purpose of influencing the legislators on behalf of their
cause was a "thing of value." Similarly, a Connecticut court included lobbyists'
services as "thing[s] of value." ABC, LLC v. State Ethics Comm'n of Conn.,
2001 Conn. Super LEXIS 3531 at **26-27 (Dec. 12, 2001). In a federal district
case in Pennsylvania, the court ruled that whether an item was a "thing of
value" was based on the recipient official's subjective interpretation. United
States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1174 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
121. McDade, 827 F. Supp. at 1174. Perhaps the closest tie between the
terms "lobbying" and "thing of value" was the definition of lobbying below:
A lobbyist is a person who in return for money or other thing of value
agrees to attempt to influence, directly or indirectly, the passage or
defeat of any legislation which may include investigations by the
Congress. Lobbying is lawful activity permitted and regulated by the
Congress. A lobbyist may not, however, endeavor corruptly to influence,
obstruct or impede a Congressional investigation.
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With New Jersey's stance on strict regulation of the casino
industry, it seems likely that the court would broadly interpret
"thing[s] of value" to include lobbyists' services, and thus prohibit
them under section 138.
A second way in which Schiller Park Colonial Inn is
distinguishable from In re Soto is that the Illinois court refused to
rule on whether the statute was overbroad in banning officers,
associates, representatives, agents, employees of licensees, as well
as the licensees themselves, from making such contributions.'
The Schiller Park Colonial Inn court stated that only an employee
or associate of a liquor licensee could bring such an argument, not
the licensees themselves.'23 Ms. Soto, on the other hand, was such
an officer/employee. The In re Soto court explained that section
138 was not overbroad in including casino officers and key
employees because the statute was narrowly drawn and precisely
tailored to apply to persons in a supervisory position and to
empower those making discretionary decisions that regulate
casino operations.""
Thus, the clear theme throughout the In re Soto decision was
that "a constitutional interest may be impeded by a state only if
the state has a conflicting interest sufficient to justify the
deterrent effect on the free exercise of the constitutionally
protected right." 2 ' The In re Soto court reasoned that the right to
make political contributions might be forgone for the greater
purpose of avoiding impropriety or its appearance. 2 6 This is
particularly true in the casino gaming industry, in which large
sums of money 27might appear to influence the government and
elected officials.

(emphasis added) United States v. Mitchell, 877 F.2d 294, 300 n.6 (4th Cir.
1989).
122. Schiller Park Colonial Inn, 349 N.E.2d at 67. The licensees in Schiller
Park Colonial Inn argued that, in the alternative, even if the statute was not
unconstitutional as it applied to them, it was overbroad as it applied to their
employees and associates. Id. However, because it was the licensees
themselves who were bringing the suit, the court said that the licensees did
not have standing to raise the issue regarding constitutionality as to their
associates and employees. Id. That is, those who challenge the
constitutionality of a statute must be within a class of persons who claim to
suffer harm by its alleged unconstitutionality. Id.
123. Id.
124. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1100. In fact, the court even estimated the
number of persons likely to be affected by the section 138 ban on contributions
to be only 3.5% of all casino employees. Id. at n.4. Thus, the court reasoned
that the statute did not extend too far in fulfilling the state's interest. Id. at

1100.
125. Id. at 1095 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)).

126. Id. at 1106.
127. Id.
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Although In re Soto was the first decision to analyze a statute
prohibiting contributions from casino personnel, other courts soon
analyzed similar issues. While the questions were similar, the
results were not.
B. The Second Phase: Courts Find Legislation Banning
Contributions Unconstitutional
In recent years, Louisiana courts have had the opportunity to
interpret several of their statutes and administrative rules
regarding the regulation of political contributions from persons in
the gaming industry."' 9 In these cases, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana has interpreted the regulations in very different ways.
First, in Brown v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public Safety &
29
Corrections,'
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's finding that a state statute prohibiting video gaming
licensees from making contributions to committees supporting or
opposing issues was unconstitutional. 3 ° On its face, the statute at
issue was very similar to section 138, which the New Jersey court
found constitutional in In re Soto. So why did the two courts rule
differently?
First, the facts of the two cases are quite distinct. In Brown,
the plaintiff, Charles Brown was a video gaming licensee who
wished to promote video poker by contributing to an advertising
fund. 3' The Brown court closely examined the ruling of In re Soto
but distinguished it. 3 ' The Louisiana court reasoned that while
the New Jersey statute prohibited contributions to candidates or
groups supporting candidates, the Brown case dealt with
contributions promoting a point of view."

128. Brown v. State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., 680 So.2d 1179 (La.
1996); Penn v. State ex rel. Foster, 751 So.2d 823 (La. 1999); Casino Ass'n of
La. v. State ex rel. Foster, 820 So.2d 494 (La. 2002).
129. Brown, 680 So.2d at 1179.
130. No member or board employee nor a member of the immediate family of
a board member or board employee shall make a contribution or loan to, or
expenditure of behalf of, a candidate or committee.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27:13(C)(6).
131. Brown, 680 So.2d at 1180. The procedural history of Brown was that
the trial court had found the statute unconstitutional and issued a
preliminary injunction. Id. A suspensive appeal had been granted. Id.
132. Id. at 1182.
133. Id. As author Colin Black pointed out, this distinction is important
because spending to influence a referendum will not have the same potential
for corruption as spending on behalf of a candidate; this is because there is
simply no candidate to corrupt. Colin A. Black, Recent Development: Brown v.
State: The Louisiana Supreme Court Considers Free Speech, Campaign
Finance, and Legalized Gambling, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1605 (1997). Several
U.S. Supreme Court cases have also recognized this difference. See, e.g., Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480,
497 (1985) (holding that expenditures to advocate views and money
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The Brown court also took a different position from that of In
re Soto regarding a state's interest in regulating the gaming
industry.
The Brown court relied in part on another case
concerning the liquor industry, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, a United States Supreme Court decision. 3 This case was
somewhat factually similar in that it dealt with the prohibition on
the advertising of liquor, which, like gaming, is something that
some people consider a "vice." 3 The Brown court agreed with the
United States Supreme Court in ruling, "[t]he fact that many
consider gambling and liquor vices does not justify the suppression
of differing views. There is no vice exception to the right of free
speech." 3 ' Indeed, the United States Supreme Court stated in 44
Liquormart that it is "paternalistic" to suppress truthful
commercial information simply because the state assumes that the
public will misuse it." 7 The Brown court recognized that gaming
itself is strictly regulated and may be suppressed.'3 8 However, it
was quick to note that "the State may not ban commercial speech
simply because the State may constitutionally prohibit the
underlying conduct."'39
While the Brown court also recognized that prevention of
corruption was an important state objective, it reasoned that
corruption was only likely to be a problem when licensees made
contributions to candidates or their committees, giving the
appearance of quid pro quo dollars for political favors. However,
the court stated that corruption was not likely to be an issue when
contributions are made to committees supporting or opposing
ballot measures. "' Not only did the Brown court say that there is
"no significant state interest" in prohibiting contributions for
ballot measures,' it further stated that communicating such ideas

contributed to a candidate are fundamentally different); Let's Help Florida v.
McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), affd, 454 U.S. 1130 (1982) (holding
that contributions to political committees organized to urge passage of a casino
gambling amendment was unconstitutional); Colo. Republican Campaign
Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 614 (1996) (holding that there
is a distinct difference between expenditures coordinated with a candidate and
independent expenditures).
134. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
135. Id. at 508.
136. Brown, 680 So.2d at 1183 (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 514).
137. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 497.
138. Brown, 680 So.2d at 1183.
139. Id. (citing 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 511). Similarly, in GreaterNew
OrleansBroad. Ass'n v.United States, 519 U.S. 801 (1996), the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned a 5th Circuit court case from Louisiana banning casino
advertising, relying on the 44 Liquormartdecision.
140. Brown, 680 So.2d at 1183 (citing Citizens Against Rent Control v. City
of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298 (1981)).
141. Id. at 1181.
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requires the expenditure of money.' 42 Thus, the court reasoned,
Louisiana may not restrict contributions to committees organized
to communicate ideas. For this reason, the Brown court found the
statute to be unconstitutional.
Nevertheless, there was a strong dissenting opinion in Brown
by Justice Joseph Bleich. 4'
Although he appreciated the
paramount importance of First Amendment protections to both
political association and political speech, he also recognized that
these constitutional interests might be impeded in certain
instances.'
When the state has a sufficiently compelling
countervailing interest and the restriction is narrowly tailored to
meet the state's interest, the constitutional interest may be
limited."i However, Justice Bleich voted against the majority, not
because he expressly disagreed with their decision, but because he
felt their decision was premature."6
It is interesting that Justice Bleich correctly foreshadowed
the litigation that would follow. 147 While he noted that the validity
of contributions to candidates was not questioned in that case, he
predicted that the issue would ultimately be presented to the
court. Thus, he reasoned that the Louisiana courts had not heard

142. Id. at 1183. There may be other reasons why the Brown decision was
different from the court's decision in In re Soto. First, Ms. Soto was a "key
employee" in the casino industry. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1092. Perhaps
because of her powerful position, the New Jersey court seemed to view her
contribution as if it were made symbolically from the wealthy casino industry
itself. Id. at 1097. Because of the need to regulate such huge sums of money,
the New Jersey court perhaps felt that the potential for corruption was
greater, and that therefore greater restrictions were acceptable. On the other
hand, Charles Brown was merely the owner of a lounge. Brown, 680 So.2d at
1179. Perhaps the Louisiana court thought that because he was an individual
acting alone and not as a representative of a huge industry, the potential for
corruption was less, and that therefore such restrictions were not acceptable.
143. Brown, 680 So.2d at 1183-85 (Bleich, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1183 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958)).
Justice Bleich wrote at length about Louisiana's tumultuous 300-plus-year
history with gaming, most notably the Louisiana Lottery, also known as the
"Golden Octopus." Id. The Louisiana Lottery Co. was said to have bribed
legislators and paid off state newspaper editors to ensure a good public image.
Id. at 1185. Its owners made millions, but Louisiana received almost nothing.
Id. Wherever gambling went, other problems followed. Vices such as
prostitution, crime, corruption, and other societal ills, including poverty and
negative impact on families and communities, arose wherever gambling was
legal. Id.
146. Id. at 1183. Bleich noted that the case was "not factually ripe for
decision." Id. He was concerned that the controversy needed a full trial on the
merits, not merely a hearing for a preliminary injunction. Id. He felt that this
decision should not have been rendered before a complete and fully developed
record had been presented to the court. Id.
147. Id. at n.1.
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the last on the controversy of political contributions by those in the
gaming industry.
As predicted by Justice Bleich in his dissenting opinion in
Brown, in Penn v. State ex rel. Foster, the Louisiana Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of a statute restricting the
right of holders of video-draw-poker licenses to contribute to
candidates or political committees of candidates. "
For reasons very similar to those in Brown, the court affirmed
the lower court's ruling that such a statute was unconstitutional,
reasoning
that it
violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 9
Although the court was again concerned with preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption, the court's focus
centered on the restrictions of the First Amendment rights of those
affected. 10 The majority ruled that the First Amendment does not
permit the State to target certain groups and exclude them from
the political process."' The majority also reasoned that attempts
to regulate speech pose a constitutional
threat that is greater than
1 52
attempts to regulate conduct.
The Penn court was also concerned that the statute was not
uniform in its application to members of the video poker
industry."' The fact that some groups were excluded while others
148. Penn. v. State ex rel. Foster, 751 So.2d 823, (La. 1999).
No person to whom this Subsection is applicable.., shall make a
contribution, loan, or transfer of funds, including but not limited to any
in-kind contribution.., to any candidate, any political committee of any
such candidate, or to any political committee which supports or opposes
any candidate.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2(L)(2) (2006).
The persons to whom the statute applied were defined as follows:
Any person who holds a license or permit as a distributor of gaming
devices, who holds a license or permit as a manufacturer of gaming
devices, who holds a license or permit as a device service entity, and any
person who owns a truck stop or licensed pari-mutuel or off-track
wagering facility which is a licensed device establishment, all pursuant
to the Video Draw Poker Devices Control Law.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 18:1505(L)(3)(a)(i).
149. Penn, 751 So.2d at 824; U.S. CONST. amend. I, XIV § 2.
150. Penn, 751 So.2d at 826. Indeed, the court was committed to including
campaign contributions as a form of political speech. Id. The court recognized
that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
151. Id. Again, the court was concerned that the complete prohibition on
contributions was far more restrictive than the contribution limits upheld in
Buckley. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).
152. Id. at 831. "The State cannot legalize several forms of gambling in one
fell swoop and then shortly thereafter limit the First Amendment rights of
some persons in the gambling industry by claiming that the now legal,
licensed and highly regulated industry is corrupt." Id. at 839 (Lemmon, J.,
concurring).
153. Id. at 830 (Johnson, J., concurring). The statute prohibited
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were not would seem to defeat the purpose of preventing
The Penn court, like the earlier Brown court,
corruption."'
rejected the reasoning of In re Soto and Schiller Park Colonial Inn
that the state's interest in regulating certain "vice" industries
sufficiently outweighed First Amendment rights. 55
As could have been predicted from Brown, there were strong
dissents in Penn. The dissenters found support for the statute's
constitutionality through the In re Soto and Schiller Park Colonial
Inn decisions." 6 Above all, the dissenters reasoned that political
speech by association and activity is much more strongly protected
than the giving of contributions." 7
The dissenters argued that the ban on contributions was
closely drawn to achieve a compelling state interest: the
prevention of, or appearance of, corruption."' In arguing so, the
dissenters rejected the petitioners' argument that campaign
Thus, the
disclosure regulations sufficiently met this goal."'
dissenters asserted that they would have refused to second-guess
the legislature's measure in banning certain contributions
In particular, they noted that gambling is an
altogether."'
"absolute revocable privilege" and that it has a unique, if not
infamous, place in the State's history."'
With strong arguments on both sides, the debate surrounding
political contributions from those in the gaming industry was still
far from settled in Louisiana.

contributions from distributors, manufacturers, service entities, pari-mutuel
facilities, off-track wagering facilities, and truck stops. Id. However, the
statute did not prohibit contributions from owners of devices, bars,
restaurants, lounges, and clubs. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 836-37. Instead, the Penn court again looked to 44 Liquormart,
which found no vice exception to the protection of commercial speech. Id.
(citing 44 Liquormart,517 U.S. at 513-14).
156. Penn, 751 So.2d at 848 (Knoll, J., dissenting); Id. at 844-45, 847

(Victory, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 848 (Knoll, J., dissenting); Id. at 844-45 (Victory, J., dissenting).
Indeed, the dissenters likened financial support to candidates as "speech by
proxy," and noted, "The transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor." Id. at 848 (Knoll, J.,
dissenting) (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21). Justice Skelly Wright has also
advocated this viewpoint. J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976).
158. Penn, 751 So.2d at 852.

159. Id.
160. Id. As Bleich had noted in his dissent in Brown, the Penn dissenters
commented on Louisiana's history with gambling. Id.

161. Id.
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C. The Third Phase: Courts Support Legislation Banning
Contributions-

Again

In Casino Association of Louisiana v. State ex rel. Foster, the
Louisiana Supreme Court once again confronted the issue of the
constitutionality of statutes barring political contributions from
members of the gaming industry.162 The statute evaluated was the
same as that in Penn; however, the parties contesting the
statute's constitutionality were a different group: a casino
This time, they challenged the
association and its members."
applicability of the statute as it applied to a different contributing
The statute stated that the ban also applied to
class. 6'
contractors, spouses, key employees, holding companies, and
persons with direct or indirect interest in the activities listed.1"
This time, the court departed from precedent in earlier cases
and reversed the trial court, holding that the statute was
constitutional.'67 Why did the Casino Association of Louisiana
court radically depart from its previous rulings in Brown and
Penn?

First, the CasinoAssociation of Louisiana court observed that
in Penn and Brown, only some portions of the statute were under
Just as Brown had foreshadowed Penn, Penn had
attack. 66
foreshadowed Casino Association of Louisiana in noting that the
court was only ruling on the validity of certain portions of the
statute. 169 This implied that future courts evaluating different
parts of the statute would not be bound by past decisions.
162. CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 494.
163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 18:1505.2(L)(2).
164. CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 494.
165. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1505.2(L)(3)(a)(ii) (2007) holds:
Any person who holds a license to conduct gaming activities on a
riverboat, who holds a license or permit as a distributor or supplier of
gaming devices or gaming equipment including slot machines, or who
holds a license or permit as a manufacturer of gaming devices or gaming
equipment including slot machines issued pursuant to the Louisiana
Riverboat Economic Development and Gaming Control Act [La. R.S.
27:41 et seq.], and any person who owns a riverboat upon which gaming
activities are licensed to be conducted.
Id.
166. Casino Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 496-97 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
18:1505.2(L) et seq. (2007)).
167. CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 495.
168. Id. at 497, 499 (citing Penn, 751 So.2d at 824, n.2); Brown, 680 So.2d at
1182.
169. Casino Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 497, 499. For example, the Casino
Ass'n of La. court distinguished the video poker industry, which had been at
issue in Penn, from the casino industry, which was at issue in Casino Ass'n of
La. Id. First, the number of video poker licensees was potentially unlimited.
Id. On the other hand, the state legislature had authorized only one landbased casino and 15 riverboats. Id. (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 27:241,
27:65).
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Second, prohibitions in Penn did not apply equally to all
persons in the video poker industry, thus they were held to be
unconstitutional." 0 On the other hand, the restrictions on those in
the casino industry were uniform and thus upheld."'
The Casino Association of Louisiana court, like its Brown and
Penn predecessors, focused on whether there was a compelling
state interest in restricting First Amendment rights.'72 However,
this time, the court favored the state's interest over that of the
petitioners. The Casino Association of Louisiana court stated that
the legislature's ability to license, regulate, and suppress gaming
was a legitimate exercise of police power, the purpose of which was
to protect the public welfare by keeping the state free from
criminal and corrupt elements.' 3
This court, unlike its predecessors in Brown and Penn,
recognized the validity of In re Soto and Schiller Park Colonial
Inn.74 Perhaps Casino Association of Louisiana recognized the
decisions' validity in part because a significant body of case law
had been developing throughout the country in the immediate
aftermath of Brown and Penn, both of which upheld bans or limits
on contributions .
170. CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 509.
171. Id. Indeed, as author Scott Mason points out, as a result of Penn and
Casino Ass'n of La., there now exists the anomalous situation that Louisiana
video poker licensees may contribute up to $5,000 to a candidate, but casino
and riverboat interests can contribute nothing. Scott Mason, Casenote: Casino

Ass'n of Louisiana v. State: The Louisiana Supreme Court's Retreat From First
Amendment Protection for Campaign Contributors,48 LoY. L. REV. 795, 818
(2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § § 18:1505.2(H)(1)(a), 18:1505.2(H)(2)(a) (1981).
Mason predicts that because Casino Ass'n of La., the latter decision, approved
the bans, this dichotomy will likely be resolved in the future by uniform bans
rather than uniform repeal of the bans. Mason, supra note 43, at 818.
172. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24).
173. CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 505 (citing Theriot v. Terrebone Parish
Police Jury, 436 So.2d 515, 516 (La. 1983)); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27:2(A)
(1996). The court also emphasized that any license or permit for gaming was
an "absolute revocable privilege and not a right, property or otherwise."
Casino Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 505 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27:2(B)).
The Casino Ass'n of La. court also pointed out that because this particular
statute would only affect one land-based casino and 15 riverboats, a ban would
have a "very minimal effect on candidates' ability 'to amass the resources
necessary for effective advocacy."' CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 503 (citing
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21).
174. CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 503.
175. See id. (citing State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597
(Alaska 1999)) (upholding the complete ban on campaign contributions by outof-district lobbyists); North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Bartlett, 168 F.3d
705 (4th Cir. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of the complete ban of
campaign contributions by lobbyists); Inst. of Governmental Advocates v. Fair
Political Practices Comm'n, 164 F. Supp.2d 1183 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (upholding
the constitutionality of the complete ban of campaign contributions by
lobbyists); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000)
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Additionally, the Casino Association of Louisiana court
In
examined the legislature's intent in passing the statute. 17
advocating for the passage of this bill, Senator Dardenne had
emphatically stated that the purpose of the bill was177to limit the
gambling industry's influence in the political process.
Further, the Casino Association of Louisiana court rejected
the petitioners' position that the statute served no legitimate
purpose. 178 The petitioners argued that other statutes providing
for extensive background checks and strict licensing restrictions
for casino licensees were sufficient to ensure that such individuals
Like the court in In re Soto, the
were suitable and honest. 7
CasinoAssociation of Louisiana court refused to second-guess the
legislature.
But because the policy issues and arguments for each side
were essentially the same as those in Brown and Penn - whether
the state's regulatory interest outweighed the individuals' speech
interest - how did the tide shift from Penn in 1999 to Casino
Association of Louisiana in 2002? Did the court really find
distinguishing facts between the video poker and casino
industries, or was there a change in policy?
To answer this question, an examination of the individual
justices' rulings may be helpful. Both cases were decided by the
Piecing together the
narrowest of margins: four to three.18
opinions, one
dissenting
and
authors of the majority, concurring,
in Penn
who
wrote
the
justices
of
none
that
may determine
of
Louisiana.'8
Association
Casino
in
positions
changed their
Another justice who concurred with the majority in Penn, Justice
(upholding constitutionality of limits on campaign contributions). The Casino
Ass'n of La. court even recognized the validity of similar restrictions in Blount
v. SEC, which had been decided in 1995-before Brown and Penn, and yet
ignored by both of them. Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(upholding restrictions on municipalities securities professionals from
contributing or soliciting contributions for campaigns of officials from whom
they might obtain business).
176. Casino Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 506-07 (citing Committee on Senate
and Governmental Affairs, Verbatim Transcript, Senate Bill 12, Senator
Dardenne (Mar. 26, 1996)).
177. Id. He had noted that such a ban had been successful in New Jersey (a
reference to In re Soto), and he emphasized that this limitation was of
paramount importance to the people of Louisiana as well. Id.
178. Id. at 508.
179. Id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27:310(B)-(C) (1999).
180. Penn, 751 So.2d at 823; Casino Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 494.
181. Penn, 751 So.2d at 823; Casino Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 494. That is,
the justices who wrote for the majority or concurrence in Penn (Johnson,
Calogero, and Kimball, JJ.), who found the statute unconstitutional, dissented
in CasinoAss'n of La. for all the same reasons. Penn, 751 So.2d at 823; Casino
Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 494. Similarly, Justice Victory, who dissented in
Penn, wrote the majority opinion in Casino Ass'n of La. Penn, 751 So.2d at
823; CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 494.
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Lemmon was no longer on the bench when Casino Association of
Louisiana. was decided.'82 Would it be reasonable to conclude that
the only difference between the outcomes of Casino Association of
Louisiana and Penn is the "chance" replacement of one justice?
One will never know how Justice Lemmon would have decided
Casino Association of Louisiana, so perhaps this question is
unanswerable.
It is notable that omitted from Casino Association of
Louisiana was any reference to the scandals that plagued
Louisiana in recent history. 1" Perhaps rather than guessing that
the replacement of one justice might have been the reason for the
difference between the Casino Association of Louisiana and Penn
decisions, it may be plausible to say that the tide of public policy
was truly turning. Perhaps the court was not just giving lip
service to the importance of preventing corruption or even the
appearance of corruption, especially now that it was a reality.
One author has questioned whether Casino Association of
Louisiana might have opened a Pandora's box of additional
regulation of political contributions aimed at even more industries
having a tendency toward corruption." Another author suggested
that there is no meaningful difference between a vote cast by an
M

182. Penn, 751 So.2d at 823, Casino Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 497, n.4.
Although Casino Ass'n of La. does not mention the names of the other three
justices who sided with Victory in constituting the majority, we know from
other Louisiana Supreme Court opinions that Justice Weimer was the
newcomer, replacing Justice Lemmon. State v. Harris, 820 So.2d 471 (La.
2002); In re Bolton, 820 So.2d 548 (La. 2002). Therefore, we can also conclude
that Justices Traylor and Knoll, who dissented in Penn, concurred in Casino
Ass'n of La. Penn 751 So.2d at 823; CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 494.
183. For example, the Casino Ass'n of La. court did not mention whether it
considered that Louisiana Governor, Edwin Edwards, and several aides had
been convicted in 2000 for accepting bribes to grant casino licenses. Michelle
Millhollon, Corruption Suit to Go On, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), p.
11-A (June 11, 2002). Nor did Casino Ass'n of La. reference ex-senator Larry
Bankston's conviction in 1997 for accepting payments from a truck stop owner
in return for assistance in halting a local option vote. Joe Gyan, Jr.,
Prosecutors Oppose Retrial for Ex-senator Bankston, THE ADVOCATE (Baton
Rouge, La.), p. 4-B; (June 13, 2001). Nor did Casino Ass'n of La. mention
Representative Sebastian Guzzardo's resignation in 1996 after he admitted
accepting payments from organized crime-affiliated video poker companies in
exchange for trying to influence the Louisiana Gaming Board to grant
licensees to them. Joe Gyan, Jr., Guzzardo Quits After Guilty Plea, THE
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), p. 1A (May 2, 1996).
184. Christopher James Kane, Comment: Analyzing the Campaign Finance
Debate: The Spectrum of Reform and Louisiana's Trump Card, 4 LOY. J. PUB.
INT. L. 27, 54 (Spring 2003). Kane asks whether the recent ENRON and
WorldCom scandals will cause legislatures to more strictly regulate
contributions from corporations. Id. Kane further notes that because Casino
Ass'n of La. gives the legislatures more power to regulate campaign
contributions, it also gives them the power to reduce the political voice of
select groups, as long as a compelling public interest can be shown. Id. at 55.
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elected official against the will of the majority of his or her
constituents because of a bribe and the same vote cast because of a
campaign contribution.'
There is probably some truth to this
statement.
However, until a more viable alternative is
established, the constitutionality of bans on campaign
contributions from those in the gaming industry will probably be
upheld.

IV. PROPOSAL
Although there are compelling arguments for allowing
unrestricted political contributions, this comment favors the
restrictions that have been upheld in cases such as In re Soto and
Casino Association of Louisiana discussed above."6 This section
proposes that the New Jersey statute evaluated in In re Soto be
adopted as a model statute.8 7 Such a model statute might be
considered by the legislatures of states that have allowed gaming,
or at least by those states that have experienced real problems
with corruption where gambling has been involved.
The New Jersey statute proposed as a model statute for other
states reads as follows:
No applicant for or holder of a casino license, nor any holding,
intermediary.., or subsidiary company thereof, nor any officer,
director, casino key employee ... or principal employee of an
applicant for or holder of a casino license or of any holding,
intermediary.., or subsidiary company thereof.., nor any person
or agent on behalf of any such applicant, holder, company... or
person, shall.., directly or indirectly, pay or contribute any money
or thing of value to any candidate for nomination or election to any
public office in this State, or to any committee of any political party
in this State, or to any group, committee ... or association organized
in support of any such candidate or political party.18s
The reasons supporting the adoption of such a statute are
numerous.
First and most importantly, the proposed statute is strictly
drawn to meet a compelling state need. The judges who authored
opinions in the Schiller Park Colonial Inn, In re Soto, and Casino
Association of Louisiana decisions, correctly expressed deep
concern over corruption and the appearance of corruption. 9 These
judges recognized that certain industries such as liquor and

185. David A. Strauss, What is the Goal of Campaign FinanceReform?, 1995
U. CHi. LEGAL F. 141, 143 (1995).
186. In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1088; CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 494.
187. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-138.
188. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-138.
189. Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz, 349 N.E.2d 61, 66-67 (Ill. 1976);
In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1100; CasinoAss'n of La., 820 So.2d at 508.
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,gaming are inherently riskier to society than others, and for this
reason, stronger regulation of such industries is appropriate. 9 '
A state's needs addressed by the proposed model statute are
several. First, a state has a compelling interest in regulating
gaming and protecting its citizens from the dangers associated
with gaming."'
Second, a state has a compelling interest in
preventing or attempting to prevent gaming licensees from gaining
influence over legislators or other political officials.192 Third, a
state has a compelling interest in protecting the gaming licensees
themselves from being pressured into making such political
contributions.
The nature of the gaming industry itself allows for broad
discretion on the part of a legislative body to regulate the
industry.'94 Indeed, the In re Soto court boldly states that because
"gambling is an activity rife with evil" to the extent that it is
governed by the New Jersey constitution,'95 the state's regulatory
power over such an industry is virtually without limit."'
190. See generally Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc., 349 N.E.2d at 69
(upholding the constitutionality of an Illinois state statute banning liquor
licensees from making political contributions); In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1098
(upholding the constitutionality of a New Jersey state statute banning casino
key employees from making political contributions); Casino Ass'n of La., 820
So.2d at 497 (upholding the constitutionality of a Louisiana state statute
banning gaming licensees from making political contributions).
191. See Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc., 349 N.E.2d at 65 (arguing that the
state had a compelling interest in regulating alcohol and in protecting the
citizens from the dangers associated with alcohol).
192. See id. (concluding that the state had a compelling interest in
preventing liquor licensees from gaining influence over legislators and
political figures).
193. See id. (finding that the state had a compelling interest in protecting
liquor licensees from being pressured into making political contributions).
194. See In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1105 (citing Knight v. Margate, 431 A.2d
833, 842 (N.J. 1981))(noting that gambling's effect and potential for harm to
the public welfare and morals is substantial). The In re Soto court stated that
gambling, even when legalized, "has been traditionally associated with
criminality and misconduct." Id. See also Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc., 349
N.E.2d at 65 (citing Daley v. Berzanskis, 269 N.E.2d 716, 718 (Ill.
1971))(noting that the business of selling intoxicating liquor is "attended with
danger to the community" and is "closely related to certain evils in society").
Because of the problems inherent in such an industry, it is subject to any
regulation that has substantial relation to public health, safety, and welfare.
Id.
195. See In re Soto, 565 A.2d at 1105 (citing Knight, 431 A.2d at 842)(noting
that "[giambling is an activity rife with evil, so prepotent its mischief in terms
of the public welfare and morality that it is governed directly by the
Constitution itself").
196. See id. (citing Grand Union Co. v. Sills, 204 A.2d 853, 860 (N.J. 1964))
(stating that the power of the legislature to regulate a dangerous and
nonessential industry is virtually without limit); accord In re Boardwalk
Regency Casino License Application, 434 A.2d 1111, 1119-20 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1981) (following Grand Union, 204 A.2d at 853).
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Critics of campaign finance reform would most likely cry foul
at the statute proposed. Like the dissenters in Casino Association
of Louisiana, such critics argue that a statute like this
unconstitutionally impinges on donors' rights of speech and
However, more
association under the First Amendment. 197
persuasive is the majority's reasoning that the "careful exercise of
legislative power [is necessary] to protect the general welfare of
the state's people by keeping the state free from criminal and
corrupt elements. " 198

Such a model statute would be useful not only in states such
as Louisiana and New Jersey but also in Illinois, which has seen
its share of allegations of corruption involving persons in the
casino industry."
Mr. Kuhne, an author and commercial litigator, is an
advocate for "deregulation" in the world of campaign finance."0
Kuhne believes that the mere disclosure of those persons
contributing to elected officials, candidates, and political parties
will be sufficient to deal with corruption, by exposing the "primary
actors" to a "bright light." 0 ' Indeed, Kuhne advocates for a laissez-

197. Casino Ass'n of La., 820 So.2d at 510 (Calogero, J., dissenting); Id. at
511 (Kimball, J., dissenting); Id. at 512 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 505 (describing how the development of a controlled gaming
industry required strong control by the legislature). The Casino Ass'n of La.
court, quoting the Louisiana legislature, went on to state that "the legislature
further finds and declares it to be the public policy of the state that to this all
persons, locations, practices, associations, and activities related to the
operation of licensed and qualified gaming establishments and the
manufacture, supply, or distribution of gaming devices and equipment shall be
strictly regulated." Id. at 505-06. The CasinoAss'n of La. court further quoted
the legislature's statement that "any license, casino operating contract,
permit, approval, or thing obtained or issued pursuant to the provisions of [the
statute in question] or any other law relative to the jurisdiction of the board is
expressly declared by the legislature to be a[n]... absolute revocable
privilege[,] ... not a right[.]" Id. at 506.
199. See, e.g., Mike Dorning, Justice Department Nominee Linked to Lobbyist

Withdraws, CHI. TRIBUNE, Oct. 8, 2005, at Cll (stating that a lobbyist is
under federal investigation for allegedly misappropriating Native American
funds in an effort to lobby for casino interests); See also Christi Parsons & Ray
Long, Her Own Space; Having a Powerful Father Isn't Necessarily a Blessing
ForLisa Madigan, CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 11, 2005, at Magazine, CIO (describing
Attorney General Lisa Madigan's report of possible corruption in Rosemont,
the location of a proposed new casino, in which political figures of that suburb
may be affiliated with organized crime).
200. See Kuhne, supra note 71, at 633 (stating that the First Amendment's
purpose is "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail").
201. See id. at 634 (stating that such disclosure will allow for a better-'
informed electorate). This author agrees that disclosure is vital in educating
voters, but disagrees that mere disclosure is enough to eradicate the evil of
corruption. Id.
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faire attitude toward campaign contributions."' Kuhne claims
that such deregulation has worked with "eminent success" in other
industries, such as transportation, energy, and financial
services.'
Kuhne is basically
Mr. Kuhne's argument is flawed.
suggesting that campaign finance regulation is paternalistic
because people are smart enough to determine who donates to
whom, just by reading mandatory disclosure reports.0 4 He argues
that "the voters themselves can decide whether the fact that a
candidate has been heavily supported by a particular individual or
group should weigh against his candidacy." 5 However, prior to
this assertion, he states that the "total campaign spending for all
local, state, and federal elections combined amounts to no more
than fifteen dollars per eligible voter," and that "[tiotal
expenditures therefore constitute about 0.05 percent of gross
domestic product.",2 His argument in setting forth these figures is
that such spending is much lower on a per-voter basis in the
United States than in other affluent democracies in the world, and
that Americans' perception of campaign finance spending is
overestimated.2 7 However, it is more likely that the average
American would not understand such dollars-per-eligible-voter
and percent-of-gross-domestic-product calculations. What sounds
like a good argument by Kuhne - let the marketplace of ideas
regulate voters' perceptions of candidates and elected officials, by
giving voters all the information they need to make informed
choices - is likely to fail in practice, if not in theory.
In Kuhne's scenario, with disclosure attempting to do what
regulation should do, it is more likely that voters would be unable
to use the information provided by such disclosure meaningfully.
If voters cannot
This is not paternalistic; it is realistic.
understand such disclosure, then voters cannot determine whether
a candidate or elected official is beholden to special interest groups
such as casinos. And if voters are unable to determine whether
202. See id. (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. at 259) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)(arguing that the "American people are neither sheep
nor fools, and hence fully capable of considering both the substance of the
speech presented to them and its proximate or ultimate source. If that
premise is wrong, our democracy has a much greater problem to overcome
than merely the influence of amassed wealth."). This author means no
disrespect toward either Justice Scalia specifically or to the American people
generally, but campaign finance reports are not easy to read. The average
person, without a mathematical, bookkeeping, or accounting background,
would have a very difficult time reading and understanding such campaign
disclosure reports.
203. Id. at 646.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 645.
207. Id.
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candidates or officials are indebted to such special interest groups,
these voters will not be able to make meaningful choices at the
polls.
V. CONCLUSION
Gaming regulation is necessary to protect voters, especially
where casinos and industries prone to influence and corruption
exist. Laissez-faire and the invisible hand of the market place are
insufficient to regulate the market of political ideas, where an
industry such as gambling is concerned.
By analogy, regulation is necessary in our economy, to
prevent drastic downturns and depressions. It is necessary to
prevent huge corporations and trusts from monopolizing certain
industries. It would be disingenuous to suggest that regulation is
unnecessary in our economy, or that full disclosure in the form of
annual reports and filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission are sufficient to prevent wrongdoing. No one is likely
to suggest that regulation is unnecessary in our economy just
because employees, stockholders, and other members of the public
can read those reports and file a complaint if they do not like what
they find.
The potential for evil is so sufficiently dangerous that it must
be prevented from happening altogether, not merely from being
reported. Statutes such as the one proposed, upheld by our courts
and enforced by our executives, can help ensure a government that
is as free as possible from corruption without sacrificing the rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment.

